Speical Report
TradeTrend
Published: Sept 17, 2026
NEW DELHI, September 17, 2026: BRICS has put cross-border payment links and local-currency settlement further into its economic agenda, but the BRICS information portal InfoBRICS has used language that goes beyond the wording adopted by the bloc's leaders, describing local currencies as a way to accelerate the “replacement of the dollar” in intra-BRICS transactions.
The New Delhi Declaration instead calls for continued work on the interoperability of payment and messaging channels and discusses promoting trade settlements and investments using BRICS local currencies. It also says the work should respect national priorities and recognises that there is “no one-size-fits-all approach.”
The wording on the BRICS information portal therefore raises a broader question about the direction of the programme. Is the bloc building additional ways to settle trade without using the dollar, or is dollar replacement becoming an explicit objective for transactions among BRICS members?
Formal BRICS Payment Agenda
BRICS has formally placed payment connectivity and local-currency settlement inside its economic cooperation agenda. The challenge is that the New Delhi Declaration does not establish either a common BRICS currency or a single bloc-wide payment network. Instead, the declaration leaves participation subject to national priorities and explicitly says there is no one-size-fits-all approach.
The New Delhi Declaration says the BRICS Payment Task Force is exploring pragmatic solutions for efficient cross-border payments, studying interoperability between payment and messaging channels and discussing trade settlements and investment using BRICS local currencies.
That position is consistent with the broader direction identified by Carnegie India, which describes BRICS members as seeking gradual reductions in dollar dependence through national currencies rather than pursuing a serious common-currency project.
The immediate question is therefore whether BRICS is primarily building additional payment channels for transactions among its members, or whether those mechanisms are intended to become part of a broader effort to reduce the dollar's role.
Stronger Language On Dollar Replacement
The language surrounding the programme becomes considerably stronger outside the formal declaration. The qualification is that the phrase “replacement of the dollar” does not appear in the leaders' New Delhi Declaration. It appears instead in an article published by the BRICS information portal InfoBRICS.
The InfoBRICS describes the use of member countries' local currencies as “the most pragmatic and rapid way” to accelerate the “replacement of the dollar” in intra-BRICS transactions. The article also describes a common BRICS currency as a longer-term and more complicated project.
That creates a documented difference between the formal BRICS position and the stronger language being used in BRICS-linked commentary. The declaration speaks about interoperability and local-currency settlement; the InfoBRICS article describes those mechanisms as a route toward replacing the dollar in intra-BRICS transactions.
Carnegie's wider research on BRICS financial arrangements has also noted that most cross-border transactions involving BRICS members and other emerging markets continue to be invoiced in dollars, while local-currency use faces limitations in financial infrastructure and liquidity.
The next question is therefore not simply whether BRICS can conduct individual transactions without dollars, but how far the bloc's payment agenda can actually reduce dollar use in commercial practice.
India's Cautious Language Raises A Larger Question
India has been actively promoting payment connectivity and local-currency trade within BRICS, but New Delhi has been considerably more cautious when the discussion turns explicitly to the dollar.
The challenge is that India's position does not fit neatly into either a dollar-replacement agenda or a purely technical payment-connectivity programme. India is advocating mechanisms that can reduce the need for dollar settlement while avoiding language that presents the effort as a direct campaign against the dollar.
At the BRICS Business Forum in New Delhi, Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal urged BRICS countries to link payment systems, expand trade in local currencies, open markets and simplify regulations. He also highlighted India's UPI infrastructure as a possible basis for wider cooperation. His statement was widely reported in Indian media.
India's External Affairs Ministry, however, said there was no proposal for a common BRICS currency and described the focus as bilateral trade settlement in local currencies.
That creates a tension inside India's position. New Delhi is promoting mechanisms that can allow BRICS members to conduct more trade without routing every transaction through the dollar, while avoiding language that presents the initiative as a direct attempt to replace the dollar.
Chatham House has interpreted that caution as part of India's broader effort to keep BRICS positioned as a non-Western rather than explicitly anti-Western grouping. Its assessment says New Delhi has sought to downplay more contentious elements of the BRICS agenda, including de-dollarisation, and instead frame the issue around settling bilateral trade in national currencies and using digital payments to reduce transaction costs.
That raises a more specific question about India's role in the stronger “replacement of the dollar” formulation appearing on the BRICS information portal. The formal declaration does not use that language, and India's public statements have avoided it. But India is simultaneously advocating the payment infrastructure and local-currency mechanisms through which such a reduction in dollar use could occur.
The commercial context adds another layer. India is also dealing with continuing uncertainty over access to the US market. The United States currently applies an additional 10 percent duty to about 55 percent of India's exports, while around 45 percent remain outside that additional levy, according to Indian government figures reported in July. Washington is also considering further tariff pressure connected to India's purchases of Russian energy.
Those developments do not establish that tariff pressure is the reason India is promoting local-currency settlement. India has pursued rupee-based trade and payment connectivity for years, including before the latest US tariff measures.
But they do provide a wider commercial context for India's effort to expand payment and trading relationships beyond any single market. Goyal's BRICS message itself linked payment-system connectivity and local-currency trade with opening markets, expanding trade among members and partners, simplifying regulations and building resilient supply chains.
The issue is therefore not whether India is seeking an alternative to the dollar in every transaction. It is whether New Delhi sees local-currency trade and interoperable payment systems as a way to widen India's commercial options while avoiding the geopolitical cost of openly presenting that effort as a campaign against the dollar.
Independent research provides competing explanations for India's balancing position. Carnegie India describes India as pushing for greater intra-BRICS trade and a gradual reduction in dollar dependence through national currencies, while noting that the bloc's alternative financial arrangements remain largely bilateral and incremental.
An earlier analysis by the Observer Research Foundation provides another explanation for India's caution. It says India has sought to reduce dollar dependence through national-currency trade while resisting initiatives that could strengthen China's position, and argues that New Delhi has avoided supporting a BRICS currency partly because of concerns about alienating the United States and because of its wariness of China.
Chatham House reaches a related but broader reading: India is trying to present BRICS as a platform that is not explicitly anti-Western even though some members, particularly China, Russia and Iran, have pushed more openly toward reducing reliance on Western financial structures.
These assessments do not establish that India is responsible for the “replacement of the dollar” wording used by InfoBRICS. They do, however, show why India's position cannot be reduced to a technical proposal for cheaper payments.
India is seeking greater use of its own currency and payment infrastructure, wider markets for Indian trade, continued economic ties with the United States and a BRICS framework that does not require adoption of a common currency. The next question is where those objectives meet: whether local-currency settlement is principally a commercial diversification tool for India, a way to reduce specific vulnerabilities in dollar-based trade, or part of the broader BRICS effort described by InfoBRICS as replacing the dollar in intra-BRICS transactions.
Dollar Remains Embedded In Global Finance
The dollar remains deeply embedded in the international financial system even as BRICS expands local-currency mechanisms. But local-currency settlement between selected countries does not amount to displacement of the dollar across global finance. A payment can avoid the dollar at the transaction level while the wider foreign-exchange, reserve and financial infrastructure remains heavily dollar-based.
The IMF reported that the US dollar accounted for 57.13 percent of allocated global foreign-exchange reserves in the first quarter of 2026, compared with 1.99 percent for the renminbi.
The Bank for International Settlements reported that the dollar was on one side of 89.2 percent of foreign-exchange transactions in April 2025, while the renminbi was on one side of 8.5 percent.
Those figures provide a counterweight to claims of an imminent structural shift. Earlier Carnegie research has identified inadequate financial infrastructure, dollar-denominated debt, commodity pricing and the need for intermediary currencies as continuing constraints on wider local-currency use.
The next question is therefore whether BRICS can overcome the financial and commercial advantages that keep the dollar central even when governments create alternative settlement channels.
Different Members Bring Different Requirements
BRICS members already have different payment systems and different reasons for pursuing local-currency settlement. But national payment infrastructure does not automatically produce interoperability. Currency liquidity, exchange-rate mechanisms, banking relationships and regulatory rules still have to work across borders.
China has its CIPS payment infrastructure, India has UPI, Russia has developed alternative financial channels, while Brazil has operated a local-currency payment mechanism with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.
Brazil's Central Bank describes its Local Currency Payment System, or SML, as allowing bilateral payments in local currencies without requiring an intermediary reserve currency such as the US dollar. The system is intended to reduce costs and currency exposure.
Research into BRICS local-currency settlement, however, points to the importance of liquidity and foreign-exchange infrastructure. An IPEA workshop examining the issue noted that an efficient cross-border payment system requires more than lower transaction costs and also needs credit provision and liquidity.
The next question is whether different national systems can be connected in a way that is commercially useful to banks and companies rather than simply technically possible between governments.
BRICS Pay Remains A Separate Track
The wider discussion about BRICS payments is sometimes presented through the label “BRICS Pay,” but the formal programme remains focused on payment cooperation and interoperability. The New Delhi Declaration does not announce a fully operational bloc-wide payment network replacing existing international systems.
The declaration instead refers to the BRICS Payment Task Force, cross-border payment mechanisms and the interoperability of payment and messaging channels. It also explicitly recognises different national priorities.
That approach is consistent with the incremental model identified by Carnegie and IPEA, where bilateral local-currency arrangements and payment connectivity can develop without requiring a single BRICS financial system.
The next question is what form this interoperability will actually take when banks and companies, rather than governments, begin using the connected systems.
BRICS Is Not Alone
BRICS is part of a wider movement toward regional payment connectivity and greater use of local currencies. ASEAN leaders adopted a framework for regional payment connectivity and local-currency transactions in 2023. In Africa, the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System, PAPSS, has been expanding mechanisms for cross-border payments in African currencies, including arrangements involving Kenya's PesaLink.
Brazil's SML provides another regional example of bilateral local-currency settlement. These systems show that local-currency payment arrangements can develop without requiring a common currency or an explicit campaign against the dollar. They also provide comparative cases for assessing whether BRICS can turn political agreement into practical financial connectivity.
The next question is whether BRICS can achieve greater commercial use than these existing regional models while managing the substantially different currencies, banking systems and economic structures of its members.
From Declarations To Commercial Use
The decisive stage for BRICS payment cooperation will be commercial use rather than declarations alone. The challenge is that governments can agree on interoperability while companies and banks may still prefer established dollar channels because of liquidity, currency risk, pricing, convertibility and familiarity.
The documented BRICS programme currently covers payment interoperability and local-currency settlement, while research from Carnegie and IPEA points to the financial infrastructure, liquidity and market constraints that could make wider adoption gradual.
The competing positions therefore remain visible in the record: the formal BRICS declaration describes practical payment cooperation; InfoBRICS describes local currencies as a route toward replacing the dollar in intra-BRICS transactions; India advocates payment connectivity while avoiding explicit dollar-replacement language; and independent research points to substantial barriers between political agreement and commercial adoption.
The next test is increasingly visible at the level of companies and banks, where actual use will show whether these payment channels gain commercial acceptance or face rejection.
