WASHINGTON, Sept 9, 2026: U.S. President Donald Trump’s latest phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin has put renewed U.S.-Russia economic relations back into the diplomatic discussion, but any end to the Ukraine war would confront Washington, Moscow and Europe with an economic relationship radically altered since 2022.
The call followed talks by Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in Moscow and Kyiv to restart negotiations. The Kremlin said Trump pressed for a rapid end to the war and restoration of U.S.-Russia relations, while Putin said Russia had no aggressive plans toward Europe. Trump also linked an end to the conflict with significant opportunities for renewed trade and economic relations.
⚡️ Statement by Aide to the President of Russia Yury Ushakov following a telephone conversation between Vladimir #Putin and @realDonaldTrump:
— MFA Russia 🇷🇺 (@mfa_russia) September 8, 2026
đź’¬ The outcome of the visit by @SEPeaceMissions @jaredkushner was assessed as positive. This work will continue.https://t.co/jDOYJZYy0X pic.twitter.com/30KNRp51rj
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said restarting negotiations was important, while stressing that territory, security guarantees and Ukraine’s economic recovery remained central.
The diplomatic opening therefore raises a broader question: if the fighting ends, what kind of economic relationship could actually return between Russia and the West?
Could peace restore the old Russia-West economic relationship?
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace offer different assessments of the post-war environment.
ECFR’s July 2026 study envisages “managed disorder”: Russia, Europe and the United States remain rivals but develop limited, conditional cooperation to reduce the risk of renewed war. It does not assume reconciliation or a return to the pre-war order.
Carnegie’s Eugene Rumer takes a harder view, arguing that Russia is likely to emerge less secure, more aggrieved and more threatening to Europe, leaving structural causes of confrontation intact after the war.
U.S. Census Bureau data show two-way U.S.-Russia goods trade fell from about $36 billion in 2021 to $4.36 billion in 2025. During the first seven months of 2026, U.S. exports to Russia were $346.1 million and imports $1.956 billion, putting two-way trade at about $2.3 billion.
Would Europe be more open to economic normalisation than its security policy suggests?
Carnegie’s assessment of Europe-Russia talks argues that dialogue with Moscow should serve Ukraine’s independence and European peace and security rather than become an objective in itself.
ECFR allows greater scope for selective, conditional cooperation alongside continued rivalry.
European business adds another perspective. BusinessEurope, representing national business federations from 36 European countries, maintains an Eurasia Network covering economic relations with Russia and Central Asia and works on sanctions, export controls and investment screening. Its 2026 trade position emphasises diversification and resilience rather than a return to previous dependencies.
The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs takes a different position, saying in March that lifting sanctions against the organisation and its leadership was a necessary precondition for restoring economic dialogue.
EU-Russia goods trade fell from €257.5 billion in 2021 to €58.1 billion in 2025, while Russia accounted for only 1.1% of EU goods trade.
The EU has extended its economic sanctions until July 31, 2027, covering trade, finance, energy and dual-use technology. Its July 2026 package added further restrictions on energy, finance, shipping and technology.
Could the European energy relationship with Russia return?
European Commission figures show Russia’s share of EU gas imports fell from 45% in 2021 to 12% in 2025. Norway supplied 31% in 2025, the United States 26%, North Africa 13%, and Azerbaijan and Qatar 4% each. LNG’s share rose from 20% to 45%.
Russian gas volumes imported by the EU fell from 152 billion cubic metres in 2021 to 36 bcm in 2025. The EU is also phasing out Russian gas, with Russian LNG imports due to be fully banned by the end of 2026.
Brookings has framed Europe’s post-2022 energy challenge around the competing objectives of security, decarbonisation and affordability. The European Commission points to reduced dependence on Russian supply alongside greater exposure to global LNG markets.
The consumer perspective adds another dimension. BEUC, the European Consumer Organisation, representing 46 consumer groups, argues that energy affordability must remain central. It has warned that geopolitical shocks continue to affect consumers and that the cost of maintaining gas networks could increasingly fall on remaining users, particularly vulnerable households and tenants.
BEUC has also called for lower grid costs, greater access to renewable energy and clean heating, arguing that reduced fossil-fuel dependence can improve long-term protection against price shocks.
Could Washington and Europe want different kinds of peace?
The possibility of different U.S. and European priorities is also reflected in European political debate.
Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel has argued that Europe should try to reopen dialogue with Russia while maintaining that Moscow’s violation of international law over Ukraine cannot be overlooked.
ECFR argues that Washington and Europe could emerge from the war with different priorities: the United States may focus more on China and other strategic concerns, while Europe remains directly exposed to Russia. Its defence analysis therefore calls for greater European capacity to act with less reliance on the United States.
Trump is linking an end to the war with renewed U.S.-Russia economic relations, while European institutions continue to link any settlement to Ukrainian sovereignty, European security and pressure on Russia.
Does Putin’s assurance about Europe change the security calculation?
Putin’s statement that Russia has no aggressive plans toward Europe represents Moscow’s position, but European security assessments continue to treat Russia as a significant security concern.
Carnegie argues that Russia is likely to remain a difficult security challenge after the war. ECFR similarly argues that Europe must retain the capacity to deter Russia while allowing for limited cooperation.
Its “managed disorder” framework therefore envisages deterrence, rivalry and selective engagement continuing alongside any future dialogue.
Is Ukraine ready for a settlement that could unlock economic normalisation?
Kyiv has signalled willingness to negotiate, but not acceptance of an unspecified settlement. Zelenskyy has said negotiations should restart while insisting that territory, security guarantees, Ukraine’s future and economic guarantees for reconstruction remain central.
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) assesses the negotiating environment as difficult, while ECFR considers a ceasefire possible without resolving all territorial and security questions.
A comprehensive settlement and a ceasefire that leaves major territorial or security issues unresolved would therefore present different conditions for sanctions relief, reconstruction and wider economic relations.
Is Trump’s current initiative different enough to change the negotiating equation?
The current initiative combines diplomacy with a stronger public emphasis on restoring U.S.-Russia economic relations.
Earlier U.S.-Russia discussions examined agriculture, fertilizer, maritime insurance, ports and payment systems. The renewed effort also involves direct engagement with both Moscow and Kyiv.
ECFR sees scope for limited, conditional cooperation, while CFR remains cautious about the negotiating environment.
Could peace turn into trade negotiations quickly?
A settlement would not automatically restore trade. U.S. and EU sanctions, export controls and other restrictions would still require separate political and legal decisions.
The economic base has also changed sharply. U.S.-Russia goods trade fell from about $36 billion in 2021 to $4.36 billion in 2025, while EU-Russia trade declined from €257.5 billion to €58.1 billion.
For European companies, the break has also involved changes to supply chains, energy sourcing and operating strategies.
2026
9% expected sanctions to begin lifting
The Association of European Businesses (AEB), representing more than 380 European, international and Russian companies, surveyed 119 businesses in 2026. Its Business Climate Index fell to 111 points, while 50% expected additional sanctions and only 9% expected sanctions to begin being lifted.
BusinessEurope’s 2026 position emphasises competitiveness, resilience and diversification. The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, meanwhile, has called sanctions relief a precondition for restoring economic dialogue.
What kind of economic relationship could emerge?
ECFR’s “managed disorder” framework allows conditional economic cooperation alongside continued rivalry. Carnegie’s assessment points to a longer period of security confrontation. European policy, meanwhile, shows that some strategic dependencies, particularly in energy, are already being dismantled.
The Sept. 8 call has reopened diplomacy, but the economic relationship that could follow remains dependent on the terms of any settlement, future sanctions and security arrangements, and the decisions of governments and businesses.
