KARACHI, November 2, 2026: A Palestinian family sheltering amid Gaza’s ruins will judge Israel’s election by what follows the counting of ballots: whether displacement ends, homes can be rebuilt and freedom becomes a political possibility. Israelis are choosing who should govern them. Palestinians, without a vote in the state exercising decisive power over their lives, must wait to discover whether different leadership will offer a different future. Their circumstances are profoundly unequal, yet neither people can escape the consequences of decisions made about the other.
Israel’s October 27 election has placed Benjamin Netanyahu’s political survival in question without establishing a clear alternative government. Pre-election surveys suggested a close contest with his principal challenger, former army chief Gadi Eisenkot, and no assured parliamentary majority for either competing bloc. Coalition bargaining may determine whether Netanyahu departs, survives or returns through another arrangement. The deeper question is whether the next government will reconsider the assumptions that have made recurring war appear more achievable than lasting peace.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his wife Sara Netanyahu voted at a Jerusalem polling station: "Go out and vote!" https://t.co/rB0UofkG32
— Prime Minister of Israel (@IsraeliPM) October 27, 2026
The opposition’s differences with Netanyahu over judicial independence, military service and government accountability matter. Restoring institutional restraints could begin repairing a divided society. Yet an opposition united around removing one man may struggle to agree on Palestinian rights. Democratic renewal within Israel and justice for Palestinians are distinct responsibilities, but pursuing the former while indefinitely postponing the latter will leave a central source of instability untouched.
The election’s promise can be assessed through six connected questions. Will Palestinians be protected against displacement? Will detainees receive justice? Will violent settlers face the law? Will Gaza be allowed to rebuild? Will Palestinian representatives become partners in substantive negotiations? And will Arab citizens be accepted as legitimate partners in governing Israel? Together, these questions connect immediate human protection with the political recognition on which coexistence depends.
Israel's Political Transition and the Prospect of Change
The first concerns the right to remain. Will the next government stop the forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza and the occupied West Bank? Departure cannot meaningfully be described as voluntary when bombardment, demolition, intimidation or the destruction of essential services makes remaining intolerable. Protecting communities against removal and enabling displaced families to return safely would distinguish a government seeking accommodation from one allowing dispossession to determine the territorial outcome.
The second asks whether legality will reach inside Israeli detention facilities. Palestinians held without a lawful basis should be released; those facing credible criminal allegations must receive prompt and fair trials. United Nations experts’ warnings about torture and other abuse require independent investigation, access to lawyers and medical care, and accountability where wrongdoing is established. A government promising to restore legality cannot apply that promise selectively. Its treatment of those in custody will reveal whether reform extends beyond its own electorate.
The third concerns enforcement against violent settlers. Some opposition leaders, including Eisenkot, have condemned settler violence more clearly than Netanyahu. That difference deserves recognition, particularly from communities whose safety depends on whether the authorities intervene. But condemnation becomes policy only when attacks are prevented, perpetrators prosecuted and displaced families protected in returning. Otherwise, intimidation continues to produce territorial gains while expressions of official concern accompany the process.
Gaza's Reconstruction and Palestinian Self-Government
These obligations converge in Gaza, where reconstruction presents the fourth test. The Board of Peace has advanced a framework linking recovery with Palestinian administration and phased Israeli withdrawal, including an initial recovery proposal of approximately $2.45 billion. Implementation remains entangled in contested political and security arrangements. A new government must decide whether to facilitate recovery or allow unresolved negotiations to keep civilian life suspended. Humanitarian needs cannot remain hostage to agreement on every component of Gaza’s future.Rebuilding requires reliable access for materials, machinery, fuel and humanitarian personnel, alongside functioning hospitals, schools, water and electricity networks. Palestinian participation is equally indispensable: international supervision cannot become an indefinite substitute for self-government. Reconstruction must secure the population’s continued presence, reflect its priorities and strengthen its political agency. Otherwise, recovery will restore buildings while leaving their inhabitants exposed to the conditions that made catastrophe possible.
Palestinian Statehood and Political Inclusion
This leads to the fifth and central political question: will the next government open substantive dialogue with Palestinian representatives? Negotiations over ceasefires, humanitarian access and security coordination are necessary. They cannot replace negotiations over occupation, borders, settlements, Jerusalem and sovereignty. An administration seeking regional acceptance may reopen practical contacts. Whether those contacts prepare a settlement or merely make occupation easier to administer will depend on the political destination it acknowledges.
Campaign positions offer limited grounds for expecting an early breakthrough. Both Netanyahu and Eisenkot oppose an independent Palestinian state, while coalition dependence on opponents of territorial compromise could restrict an incoming government’s choices further. Nevertheless, leadership can alter political possibilities. Recognising Palestinian national claims would challenge the assumption that indefinite control offers greater security than negotiated coexistence. Without that recognition, dialogue risks becoming a procedure through which the stronger party postpones the weaker party’s freedom.
The sixth question arises within Israel itself. Recent estimates place its Arab population at approximately 2.17 million, although this statistical category includes non-citizen residents and communities with differing identities. Many Arab citizens identify as Palestinian. Their representatives’ treatment exposes the distance between possessing a vote and being accepted as a partner in power. Equal citizenship loses substance when a community helps elect parliament but its representatives are treated as inherently unsuitable to participate in government.
Exclusion has not been absolute. Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am joined the coalition formed in 2021, demonstrating that Arab–Jewish governing cooperation is possible. Nevertheless, Netanyahu and Eisenkot have publicly rejected partnership with Arab-led parties during the campaign, even as their seats could prove decisive. Outside support for a minority government remains conceivable. Such an arrangement is legitimate when freely negotiated; it becomes troubling when communal exclusion is imposed as the condition for accepting parliamentary support.
Coalition arithmetic may compel accommodation, but durable progress requires policy influence and recognition of Arab citizens as equal political partners. No party possesses an automatic entitlement to office, and disagreements over programmes are legitimate. The question is whether Arab representatives face a presumption of exclusion that others do not. A leadership promising national healing must explain whom its conception of the nation includes.
Israel's Internal Divisions and International Standing
The difficulty of these choices has a history extending beyond Netanyahu. Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination in 1995 by an Israeli extremist opposed to the peace process was a watershed. His death did not alone cause negotiations to collapse: settlement expansion, violence, leadership failures and Oslo’s shortcomings also mattered. But it weakened the space in which compromise could be defended as a legitimate national choice. Demonstrations of strength became politically easier to reward than the construction of mutual confidence.
Netanyahu’s alliance with the far right has deepened divisions over the judiciary, religion, military service and the state’s character. These disputes concern the institutions that restrain power and the principles through which citizenship is understood. They therefore shape external choices. A political culture that treats dissent as disloyalty becomes less capable of acknowledging another people’s grievances, while territorial expansion creates constituencies with a growing interest in preventing compromise.
Under this coalition, Israel’s military campaign has reduced much of Gaza’s inhabited landscape to rubble, destroying homes, hospitals, schools and the foundations of civilian life. According to Palestinian health authorities, more than 74,000 Palestinians have been killed. Palestinian authorities separately estimate that more than 10,000 people remain buried beneath the debris, while UN estimates place the wreckage at over 60 million tonnes. Behind these figures lies the destruction of families, neighbourhoods and institutions—the accumulated life of a society whose recovery requires both reconstruction and political freedom.
The consequences extend into international law. A UN commission of inquiry has concluded that Israel committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. The International Criminal Court’s November 2024 arrest warrant against Netanyahu concerns alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including starvation as a method of warfare. A warrant is not a conviction, but a change of government would not itself terminate the proceedings. A successor would inherit the consequences of this scrutiny alongside the responsibility to prevent further abuses.
Situation in the State of Palestine: #ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rejects the State of Israel’s challenges to jurisdiction and issues warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. Learn more ⤵️ https://t.co/opHUjZG8BL
— Int'l Criminal Court (@IntlCrimCourt) November 21, 2024
Israel’s international estrangement was vividly displayed when Netanyahu addressed the UN General Assembly in September. Scores of delegates walked out, leaving a majority of seats empty. Israel retains powerful allies, but military strength and external support have not prevented a deterioration in its standing. For Israeli society, this adds another burden to insecurity, mobilisation and domestic polarisation: the reputational consequences of policies pursued in its name. Repairing international confidence and restoring citizens’ faith in their country’s direction have become connected tasks.
One troubling manifestation of declining confidence is the departure of talented Israelis. Tel Aviv University research indicates that the sharp increase in departures beginning in 2023 continued through 2025. Researchers estimate that between 45,000 and 50,000 Israelis remained abroad for a year or longer in 2025. Their work also identifies increased emigration among physicians, engineers, doctorate holders and higher-income citizens. Extended absence does not necessarily mean permanent departure, but the trend raises concerns about expertise, public services and confidence in the future.
The trend began before October 7, amid confrontation over Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul, and intensified during the insecurity and prolonged warfare following the Hamas-led attack. Migration has multiple causes, including professional opportunities, economic pressures and family circumstances. Nevertheless, political polarisation and continuing conflict feature prominently in reporting on departures. A government claiming to secure the national future must consider why growing numbers are seeking theirs elsewhere.
The possible political consequences extend beyond lost expertise and revenue. Education does not automatically imply moderation, and emigrants share no single ideology. Yet departures among citizens committed to pluralism, institutional restraint and accommodation may weaken constituencies capable of challenging extremism. Israel’s moderate segment can thus suffer attrition under the government whose direction it seeks to change. This remains a risk rather than an established outcome, but its implications for coexistence deserve attention.
Breaking the Cycle of Conflict Through Coexistence
That erosion is not irreversible. Israelis continue to defend democratic institutions, oppose settler violence and advocate coexistence; some living abroad have returned to vote. Their persistence demonstrates that alternatives survive. Sustaining them requires confidence that participation can change the country’s direction. A new government would need to restore that confidence through institutional reform and a credible political horizon, recognising the connection between domestic reconciliation and peaceful regional relations.
913,502 מצביעים ומצביעות שבחרו ישר! אני רוצה להודות לכם על שנתתם בנו אמון. נעשה הכול כדי להיות ראויים לו. בזכותכם, עשינו היסטוריה. מקבוצה מצומצמת של פטריוטים מסורים, צמחנו וכוננו מפלגה שזכתה לאמון הציבור בהיקף של 21 מנדטים - תוך שנה ושלושה חודשים בלבד. יחד הקמנו בית פוליטי חדש לחילונים, למסורתיים ולדתיים; לצעירים ולמבוגרים; לבני הכפר והעיר; לאנשי ימין, שמאל ומרכז - לכל מי שרצה לראות מנהיגות חדשה וראויה. תודה לכולכם. בכל רגע אני מרגיש על כתפיי את האחריות שניתנה לי על ידי כל אחד ואחת מכם. על ידי כל מי ששם פתק 'דרך' בקלפי. אני מבטיח לכם: אנחנו רק בתחילת הדרך. אבל המטרה ברורה, להחזיר את ישראל למסלול. נעשה ונצליח! אני מתחייב.
— Gadi Eisenkot - גדי איזנקוט (@gadi_eisenkot) November 1, 2026
October 7 inflicted profound trauma on Israeli society. The Hamas-led killing of civilians and hostage-taking demanded unequivocal condemnation. Israel’s subsequent devastation of Gaza brought immense Palestinian suffering and deepened dispossession. Neither people’s grief diminishes the other’s humanity. Yet grief has repeatedly been mobilised to close political possibilities, strengthening those who portray coexistence as an illusion and weakening those prepared to defend it.
Breaking that cycle requires policies that give restraint credibility: civilian protection, accountability, rejection of displacement and recognition of Palestinian self-determination. The international community should support measurable progress on these obligations without mistaking a new prime minister for a peace settlement. Reconstruction assistance and regional normalisation will remain fragile achievements if Palestinians continue to experience their political future as permanently deferred.
The election offers an opportunity whose value will be established by the choices that follow. Palestinians will measure change through the ability to remain, rebuild, receive justice and determine their future. Arab citizens will ask whether their votes confer an equal claim to shape government. Israelis contemplating departure will ask whether their country still offers a future they can help create. Israel’s next government has an opportunity to make peace a credible political choice before another generation inherits war as its only horizon.


