Maritime Security Faces Challenges from New Technologies and Strategic Rivalry

Published: Oct 28, 2026
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LONDON, October 28, 2026: As autonomous vessels, cyberattacks and navigation interference reshape maritime threats, strategic rivalry is testing whether global powers can agree on uniform rules to protect commercial shipping across the world’s oceans.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that maritime trade grew by 2.2 per cent in 2024 but was expected to expand by only 0.5 per cent in 2025. Longer routes pushed ton miles up by 5.9 per cent in 2024, as vessels rerouted around disrupted shipping corridors, increasing pressure on freight costs and transport capacity.

The International Chamber of Shipping’s 2025–2026 Maritime Barometer found that industry leaders ranked geopolitical instability as the leading risk facing shipping, followed by concerns including cyberattacks and regulatory fragmentation. The survey draws on responses from senior industry figures, shipowners and ship managers, adding the commercial sector’s perspective to a debate often led by governments and international regulators.

International law and competing interpretations

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes the international legal framework for maritime zones, navigation and states’ rights and obligations at sea. It operates alongside other applicable international law and specialised agreements covering areas such as ship safety, communications and maritime crime.

The United States has not ratified UNCLOS, although successive administrations have regarded many of its provisions as reflecting customary international law. China is a party to the convention. According to Security Council Report’s review of maritime security, Washington and Beijing differ over freedom of navigation and China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. The United States conducts freedom of navigation operations to challenge claims it considers inconsistent with international law. China maintains that navigational freedoms must be exercised with due regard for coastal states’ sovereignty, security and legitimate rights.

China and Russia have also challenged some approaches to maritime enforcement. Security Council Report describes Russia’s emphasis on flag-state jurisdiction and its objections to interdictions it considers inconsistent with the law of the sea or based on expansive interpretations of enforcement powers. China has resisted treating UNCLOS as the sole legal framework for every activity at sea, arguing that matters not regulated by the convention remain subject to other rules and principles of international law.

Research institutions have examined the competition over maritime rule-making from different perspectives. The Institute for Security and Development Policy examines China’s efforts to influence ocean governance and the divisions in Europe’s response. A Brookings analysis considers China’s efforts to shape maritime rules through officials and policy research networks. These analyses address competition over the development and interpretation of rules; they do not establish a common position among governments.

The Security Council has faced similar divisions over its role in maritime disputes and enforcement. China and Russia have resisted some efforts to expand the Council’s involvement in particular maritime matters, while other members have supported a broader response to threats affecting international peace, trade and freedom of navigation. The Council’s negotiations show that agreement on the importance of safe navigation does not necessarily extend to the measures governments are prepared to authorise.

Shipping costs and regional security

Maritime security also affects freight costs, port schedules, cargo operators and importing countries. UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport 2025 linked rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope to longer voyages and higher ton miles. It warned that geopolitical disruption, uncertainty and changes in trade routes were affecting maritime transport and the outlook for developing economies.

The International Chamber of Shipping’s 2025–2026 survey records industry concerns about political instability, cyberattacks and regulatory fragmentation. The chamber represents the shipping industry, so its findings describe the risks perceived by operators rather than setting international obligations for governments.

Regional incident records provide another perspective. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) recorded 133 incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia in 2025, compared with 107 in 2024. Its reporting provides a regional basis for information-sharing and cooperation among participating states, addressing incidents that are distinct from disputes over freedom of navigation between major powers.

Port authorities face a different set of risks as shipping and cargo handling become more dependent on connected systems. The International Association of Ports and Harbors’ World Ports Tracker 2025 found that 83 per cent of responding ports consistently considered cybersecurity when implementing emerging technologies. However, fewer than half of the responding ports reported belonging to a cybersecurity coordination network with other maritime supply-chain stakeholders. The survey covered 76 ports, illustrating both the adoption of cyber safeguards and gaps in cooperation.

These records cover different parts of maritime security. UNCTAD tracks the effects of disruption on trade and transport; shipping associations report commercial risks; ReCAAP documents regional incidents; and port organisations examine vulnerabilities in port operations. Their findings do not amount to a single set of global rules, but show the range of systems and stakeholders affected by maritime threats.

Cybersecurity and navigation interference

Digital systems are central to ship operations, port administration and information exchange between vessels and government authorities. In March, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) approved a maritime digitalisation strategy and advanced draft cybersecurity requirements for maritime single windows, the platforms through which ships and shipping companies submit information to ports and government agencies. The amendments are due to be considered for adoption in 2027, with entry into force expected in 2029.

The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) has developed separate technical requirements for the cyber resilience of ships and onboard systems. Its Unified Requirements E26 and E27 address cyber resilience at the ship level and the security of onboard systems and equipment. They apply to new ships contracted for construction from 2024, subject to the requirements’ stated scope. Classification societies incorporate applicable IACS requirements into their own rules, while the IMO’s work proceeds through international regulatory processes.

Satellite navigation interference raises a further challenge involving maritime operations and international communications. In a joint statement, the IMO, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and International Telecommunication Union (ITU) warned that jamming and spoofing of global navigation satellite systems can affect shipping, aviation and telecommunications. They called on states to protect satellite navigation frequencies, strengthen system resilience, maintain conventional navigation infrastructure for contingency use and improve reporting of interference.

The ITU’s remit includes international telecommunications rules and radio-frequency coordination. Its account of the agencies’ warning places navigation interference within a wider communications problem affecting several transport sectors. The statement calls for action under existing international obligations; it does not create a single enforcement mechanism for every maritime incident.

The IMO is also developing a non-mandatory Maritime Cyber Code to complement its existing cyber risk management guidance. This work is separate from the proposed mandatory cybersecurity measures for maritime single windows. The IMO’s record of the March Facilitation Committee session documents the digitalisation strategy, proposed requirements and work on maritime cyber governance.

National responses and seafarer protection

Governments have pursued national and multinational arrangements to protect commercial shipping alongside work in international institutions. In May, the United Kingdom and France announced political support for an independent, defensive multinational military mission intended to support civilian shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and conduct mine-clearance operations. The participating states said operations would begin only when conditions permitted and would comply with international law and national constitutional procedures. The joint statement set out the proposed mission’s role and conditions.

The proposal concerns a specific waterway and remains subject to the security environment and decisions by participating states. It is separate from the processes through which states negotiate general maritime rules and technical standards.

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2817 on March 11, condemning Iranian attacks against Gulf countries and Jordan and actions or threats aimed at obstructing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. China and Russia abstained.

The Security Council’s subsequent consideration of action over Hormuz exposed disagreements over authorising force and the legal basis for maritime enforcement. The Security Council Report says China and Russia opposed an April draft resolution that would have authorised the use of force to protect navigation. The draft failed, leaving Council members divided over how to secure transit through the waterway.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has addressed another consequence of the conflict: the safety and welfare of seafarers caught in dangerous waters. In April, officers of the Special Tripartite Committee of the Maritime Labour Convention called on governments to protect crews operating in conflict-affected areas. The ILO reported that approximately 20,000 seafarers were stranded in and around the Strait of Hormuz at that time. Its mandate covers working and living conditions, health and safety, repatriation and other labour protections, complementing the security responsibilities of governments and maritime agencies.

Autonomous ships and the next regulatory steps

The IMO adopted a non-mandatory International Code of Safety for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships in May. The code took effect on July 1 and applies to cargo ships covered by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). It addresses navigation, connectivity, remote operations, fire safety, search and rescue and cybersecurity, while retaining the shipmaster’s overall responsibility. The IMO plans to make the code mandatory in 2030, with it entering into force in 2032, under the IMO framework for autonomous ships.

The code is voluntary at present. The IMO’s roadmap calls for work on an experience-building phase in December 2026, followed by development of a mandatory code in 2028. Adoption is expected by July 2030, with entry into force on January 1, 2032, according to the organisation.

The ship-port interface and legal questions arising from autonomous operations also involve other IMO committees, while satellite navigation and communications fall within wider technical frameworks involving bodies such as the ITU. IACS requirements address the cyber resilience of ship systems, and port authorities are separately assessing vulnerabilities in the digital infrastructure used to handle vessels and cargo.

The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee is scheduled to resume work on the autonomous-shipping experience-building phase in December 2026. The process is intended to gather practical experience from member states and industry before work proceeds on mandatory international requirements.

Sami Ahmed, Editor, TradeTrend
About the Author
Sami Ahmed is a seasoned journalist with more than 30 years of experience in news agencies and newspapers. He is the Editor of TradeTrend and has extensively covered consulates, diplomatic affairs, bilateral relations, economy, trade and global geopolitical developments.